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Cost and sentencing: some Pragmatic  
and Institutional doubts
The debate on whether financial cost should be a factor  
in sentencing can be looked at from two angles, one  
theoretical and the other pragmatic. The theoretical angle 
examines whether the use of cost in sentencing can be  
justified under any theory or theories of punishment. The 
pragmatic angle looks at whether using cost in sentencing 
actually makes any difference to how judges sentence, that 
is, whether it will bring about any good results. In another 
article, a companion to this shorter piece, I focus mainly 
on the theoretical side.1 There, I argue that cost should 
be treated as a disfavored factor in sentencing, because 
there is no sound theoretical justification for it. If we 
believe in retributivism, especially, it will be hard to see 
how cost should figure in determining what punishment 
the offender deserves (at least at the time of sentencing). 
But even if we are not strict retributivists about sentencing, 
it is hard to fit cost assessments into any of the traditional 
justifications for punishment, including deterrence and 
rehabilitation.
In this brief essay, I focus mainly on the pragmatic 
side, asking about what goals adding cost as a sentencing 
factor is supposed to achieve, and whether it will in fact 
achieve those goals. I ask three questions in particular:  
(1) Will including cost in the Missouri Sentencing Assess-
ment Reports (SARs) actually change judicial behavior in 
the ways supporters of the reform favor? (2) Will judges 
use cost as a factor in a consistent and uniform way? and 
(3) Are judges in the best position to make cost decisions 
in sentencing, or should this be left to the legislature? 
Some of these questions, especially the first, have a sub-
stantial empirical component. We cannot know, at least 
without further time and study, whether including cost on 
SARs will appreciably change judicial behavior. Nor will 
we know whether judges will use cost in any predictably 
uniform way until we have some data.
But the uncertainty on these empirical issues may 
suggest ways in which the legislature is (ideally) superior 
as the main agent of change for sentencing.2 Legislatures 
can enact more sweeping reforms—reducing sentences 
in one fell swoop rather than piecemeal—and they can 
also do so more uniformly. There are also good reasons 
why we might want to insulate judges, especially elected 
judges, from having to decide issues of fiscal policy. 
Elected judges might feel pressure to base decisions on 
cost in tough budgetary times, which may mean they might 
sentence less than they otherwise would. Alternatively, 
judges who do decide (or are suspected of deciding) 
based on cost might face greater popular opposition for 
being too soft on criminals, by trying to save money at 
the expense of public safety.
The motivation for including cost in sentencing is in 
one way inarguable: sentences should at some level be 
determined by taking into account all relevant information, 
and sentences should be, broadly, “cost effective”: they 
should achieve their goals at the lowest feasible cost. But it 
is a separate question which institution—the legislature, 
the executive branch, or the judiciary—should be making 
decisions about cost. There are of course difficulties in  
getting legislatures to act in ways that are cost effective, 
especially when dealing with punishment. Still, things are 
starting to change, and we might hope that sentencing 
reform from the top down will happen, and happen sooner 
rather than later. Sentencing commissions should push 
legislatures to take this responsibility, and not, as is the 
case with giving judges the power to make sentencing deci-
sions, give the legislature a way to shirk that responsibility.
I. Will the reform Make any difference?
Those who defend the change in the SAR (whom I’ll call, 
simply, “reformers”) frequently make two claims. The 
first claim tries to minimize the impact of the reform by 
saying that cost is simply one more piece of information 
that judges might consider and that they could just as 
easily ignore.3 What, then, is the harm in including that 
additional information?
The second claim some reformers make is more ambi-
tious, which is that allowing judges to figure cost in their 
sentencing decisions will push judges to imprison less, 
and by the same token, reduce the overall price to the 
state of punishing criminals. At least, this is the hope in 
financially stressed times: prison is expensive, and alter-
natives to prison are not only cheaper, they may also be a 
lot better (or as good) at reducing crime. But the second 
claim stands in some tension with the first, because for 
reform actually to save the state money, cost must not 
only be one more piece of information for judges to  
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consider, it must also move some judges to choose the 
less expensive punishment who wouldn’t have otherwise 
chosen it.
Will judges actually use the cost data that is now  
available to them? The assumption that judges make cost 
assessments already is one that needs to be tested empiri-
cally. The fact that judges may consider such things as 
general or specific deterrence doesn’t automatically mean 
that they are considering such things as fiscal impact 
when they pass down sentences. The goal of saving money 
seems to be a different kind of goal than the traditional 
penological ones of preventing, deterring, and justly pun-
ishing crime.
But the new SAR might have a dynamic effect: it might 
prompt some judges who otherwise wouldn’t think about 
the cost of a sentence to think about it. Whether it has this 
effect will be determined, in part, by whether judges will 
see the making of cost as an explicit factor as either ratify-
ing past practice or representing a new (and possibly 
unwarranted) departure from it. Certainly judges might 
feel emboldened to consider cost now that they have spe-
cific (and putatively credible) numbers on the price of 
individual sentences, numbers that come with the impri-
matur of the Missouri Sentencing Commission. But other 
judges might be adamant in not using cost, saying that 
this would be a violation of their duty to sentence based on 
desert and other traditional punishment rationales, and 
not on factors exogenous to punishment, such as cost. 
Indeed, some judges have already said so.4
There are also different possibilities in how judges will 
end up using cost as a sentencing factor. Some judges 
might set out, explicitly, the lower cost of probation as a 
reason for giving someone probation rather than a prison 
term. Other judges might not factor cost explicitly, but the 
presence of cost listed on the SAR might work on them 
unconsciously. They may even deny that they are using 
cost to decide a sentence, or that they looked at the costs of 
sentences at all, but it may factor in their decisions none-
theless. (This, incidentally, might make it hard to measure 
what work the reform is doing.)
For the reform to be effective, something like the 
above possibilities has to happen—that is, judges have to 
explicitly or implicitly start using cost in making sentenc-
ing decisions. Moreover, in at least some cases, cost has 
to be not only a considered factor but a deciding one. As I 
mentioned earlier, some defenders of the reform have 
said that including cost simply means that judges simply 
have more information; this is undoubtedly true. But for 
the reform to lead to different sentences, or to lower cost-
ing sentences, the information must be doing some work 
in changing judges’ minds about what sentence to give. 
That is, it has to be possible that a judge who might other-
wise decide on a longer sentence will decide on a shorter 
sentence, or probation over prison, because that sentence 
costs less. Otherwise, putting cost on the SAR will simply 
add an extra wheel that does no part in moving the sen-
tencing machinery.
In this regard, we might worry that those judges who 
are inclined to let cost figure in a sentencing decision are 
those who are already predisposed to give lighter sen-
tences or to favor alternatives to prison. This may be either 
because they already included the cost of a sentence in 
deciding how to sentence, or because they were going to 
give the lighter or alternative sentence anyway and the cost 
simply offered no barrier to doing so (and indeed may 
even have confirmed their initial judgment). If most 
judges who are inclined to consider cost are like this, then 
the point of the reform from a pragmatic point of view will 
have been missed, because it will not change judicial 
behavior, or at least not enough judicial behavior to make 
any fiscal difference.
Or consider another possibility. Perhaps those cases 
where the cost savings would be the greatest are those 
cases where judges will be least likely to let cost make a 
difference. More serious crimes, such as murder or armed 
robbery, would probably fall into this category. For a judge 
sentencing in such a case, the idea that the cheaper sentence 
should win out because it is cheaper will seem anathema.5 
This could be another way in which cost will only do at 
best minimal work, because in the most serious cases, 
cases where the price difference between many years in 
prison and many years on probation is great, cost will be 
bracketed. Only time and further study will tell if this is 
what happens. But there seem to be some plausible rea-
sons to doubt that the reform will have any but a modest 
impact on reducing the cost of sentences, or in making 
sentencing more cost effective.
II. Will Judges Use the numbers Consistently?6
But suppose that at least some judges do use the numbers. 
If they do, we might have another reason to worry: judges 
may use the numbers differently, which will lead to dis-
parities in sentencing. There are several ways in which 
judges might differently factor cost into a sentencing deci-
sion. I want to explain how variations based on cost could 
occur before going on to explain why I think variation in 
sentencing based on cost is problematic.7
First, there might be a lack of consistency in who uses 
the numbers. Maybe when cost is listed as a sentencing 
factor, all judges will use it in their sentencing decisions. 
Then again, maybe only some will. Some judges might 
take a principled stand against using cost in sentencing, 
and so ignore the numbers on the SAR. Other judges 
might gladly use the cost figures (these may be the judges 
who had always, in a rough way, used cost as a factor in 
considering the proper sentence). Still others might 
slowly warm to the idea of using cost. In any event, there 
is no reason to believe that all judges across the board 
will use cost to determine the right sentence. The more 
likely possibility is that some judges will use cost and 
some won’t.
Second, even among the judges who do consider cost, 
there might be differences in the way they use it. Some 
may use it in every type of case; others may use it only in 
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minor nonviolent offenses. Some judges may weigh cost 
very heavily in deciding an appropriate sentence; others 
may have cost enter in only at the margins, that is, in a 
way that would rarely be decisive. So we might have a fur-
ther variation among those judges who use sentencing 
numbers, both in terms of what cases they use the num-
bers to decide and how heavily they weigh cost when they 
do use it as a sentencing factor. We could imagine there 
being profound variation in the ways judges use cost; 
some may use it aggressively, others may use it rarely,  
if at all.
Third, even one judge across time might not be consis-
tent in how he or she considers cost. A judge may on some 
days consider cost very heavily (perhaps unconsciously in 
response to news about the state’s dire fiscal straits!) but 
on other days be less inclined to have cost make any differ-
ence to who gets what sentence. Or again, he or she may 
use cost only in minor cases, and ignore cost altogether 
when it comes to violent offenses or serious property 
crimes. So even if we take one judge across time, that 
judge might use cost differently.
There is, then, some reason to believe that how cost is 
used will vary between judges and even in the same judge. 
But why should this sort of inconsistency matter? After all, 
when presented with any information—the offender’s 
past history, or even the nature of the offender’s crime— 
different judges will come to different determinations of 
how that factor should cut, and how far it should cut. That 
is in some way the beauty of a system that allows judicial 
discretion: judges are allowed to use their judgment as to 
how to assess different factors in sentencing, and how to 
weigh them in deciding what punishment is appropriate. 
Unless we eliminate judicial discretion entirely, we have  
to accept the fact that different judges may sentence differ-
ently, even when presented with roughly similar crimes 
and criminals.8
But cost might be different than other sentencing fac-
tors. Cost is not usually considered to be a paradigmatic 
sentencing factor, or even a permissible one, certainly not 
under the federal sentencing guidelines.9 It is easy to see 
why. Cost, considered solely as the financial cost of a pun-
ishment, is largely exogenous to the traditional rationales 
for punishing people: rehabilitation, deterrence, and espe-
cially retribution.10 It is a factor that is more familiar in 
legislative budgetary conversations than in punishment 
theory. Surely the burden should be on defenders of the 
reform to explain why it should be relevant in deciding 
how much, or in what way, to punish offenders. Why 
should the cost of a sentence, of all things, be capable of 
tipping the balance in favor of one sentence rather than 
another?
Imagine a prisoner who is sentenced to a longer prison 
term than another solely because one judge took cost into 
account and his judge did not. That is, one judge consid-
ered the cost of the sentence, and the other didn’t, and  
it is on that basis alone that the two sentences diverge—
not because one crime was worse than another, or because 
one criminal was a less likely candidate for rehabilitation.11 
Doesn’t the prisoner with the higher sentence have not 
just a complaint, but a legitimate complaint? It is one thing 
to explain to a prisoner that his judge is less generous  
in believing offenders can be rehabilitated and that is why 
he has a longer sentence. It is another thing, I think, to 
explain to a prisoner that the reason why he has a longer 
sentence is that his judge is not as zealous a cost cutter as 
other judges. If cost cutting is a concern, it should apply 
in a way that is uniform across all sentencing decisions:  
it is not something that should be left to the discretion of 
judges, who may use cost differently, or not at all.
And the larger the difference in sentences between 
similarly situated offenders (when the difference is based 
on cost), the greater force the claim of unfairness has. If, 
to take an extreme case, one offender is given probation 
and the other is sentenced to prison only because one 
judge likes cheaper sentences, then the offender facing 
prison has a good moral if not legal case that his sentence 
is unfair vis-à-vis the other offender. By including cost as  
a sentencing factor, we invite this type of rather arbitrary 
and unfair treatment.
Uniformity in sentencing is not the highest good, of 
course. We might want to tolerate some deviations from 
uniformity if this at least means some offenders get lower 
penalties (with the idea that sentences in general are too 
high). I might be open to such a pragmatic argument, 
especially given the overlong sentences for many crimes 
in the status quo.12 If we can reduce the harshness of a 
sentence in one instance, why does it matter that it does 
not extend to all equally situated offenders? But we should 
not be blind to the possibility of unfairness, especially 
when it is unfairness due to something outside of the 
usual reasons why we punish. Certainly we would not 
accept such a pragmatic argument for a lower sentence if 
one of the reasons the judge decided for a lower sentence 
was because the offender was white! Cost is not race, cer-
tainly, but it is a factor that, like race, is unrelated to the 
traditional purposes of punishment. For this reason, the 
unfairness that using cost might engender should make 
us wary of decisions reached on that basis.
III.  are Judges Best situated to Make reforms  
Based on Cost?
To the previous two sections, the response of the reformer 
might be to say, simply: What’s the real harm in including 
information about cost on SARs? The reformer might con-
cede that, yes, it is unlikely that many judges will take the 
new information into account when sentencing. Perhaps 
not many judges will be moved to consider cost, because of 
their understanding of the judicial role. Perhaps the cases 
where the greatest cost savings could be achieved—several 
years probation rather than several years in jail—will be the 
ones where judges will be least likely to let cost be determi-
native. Perhaps the cost savings even where a judge is 
moved to base his or her decision on costs will be merely a 
blip on the state’s overall financial picture. All of this the 
FSR2403_03.indd   166 29/02/12   10:37 AM
Federal  Sentencing  reporter  •  Vol .  24 ,  no.  3  •  February  2012 167
reformer may concede, and then use the concession to his 
advantage. For then the reformer may say, what’s the big 
deal? Some judges may use cost, and this may save the 
state some money. If it does not save money, then there is 
really no harm done.
I have already highlighted one potential problem with 
the use of cost, a problem that exists even if cost is used 
only rarely: sentences will be different for an almost arbi-
trary reason, and this is unfair. I think this is a real harm, 
however small, but again the reformer may claim that it is, 
at best, de minimis. Given the unfairness at all stages of the 
criminal justice system (who gets caught, who gets charged, 
who is found guilty), this is surely at the minor end of the 
scale, something we should not worry too much about.
But even if cost is used only rarely and even if the unfair-
ness that may result is minor and not too pervasive, I still 
think that judges using cost is a bad idea. Putting the onus 
on judges to reduce cost may distract from the main place 
where cost cutting can occur, and tough decisions about 
the cost of sentences should be made, viz., the legislature. 
Indeed, putting judges in the position of cost cutters could 
have backlash effects of a pernicious sort, especially in a 
state like Missouri that elects many of its trial judges, and 
where all judges are subject to retention elections.13 Judges 
may be pressured to use cost as a sentencing factor, if citi-
zens demand financial accountability in addition to 
judicial accountability from their judges. Here, the risk is 
not that cost will be used to tip the balance in favor of a 
sentence, but may drive the sentencing decision, to the 
exclusion of other traditional sentencing factors.
Or the incentives might work, even more perniciously, 
in the other direction. One could imagine all sorts of  
Willie Horton–inspired ads against the judge who gave a 
criminal probation because it saved the state a couple of 
thousand dollars, and the criminal went on to reoffend.  
I think we have good reason to try to insulate judges from 
this type of pressure, by not encouraging them to use cost 
as a sentencing factor, which is what the new SARs tacitly 
do.14 We normally don’t want judges to act like politicians, 
or to be subject to the same pressures that politicians are 
subject to, to pander to what people want.15 Asking judges 
to make budgetary decisions in sentencing is just another 
way of asking them to be politicians: it asks them to try to 
save money for the state. It does not merely ask them to 
do justice.
But the institutional point goes further than this. If the 
goal of letting judges consider costs is to make a dent in 
criminal justice system spending, then doing it piecemeal, 
on the retail level, is inefficient. Better to do it wholesale: 
reduce sentences across the board, rather than leaving it to 
the chance, individual decisions of judges. And not only is 
the legislature better suited to make the kind of sweeping 
changes that would actually reduce costs in sentencing  
in a real and perceptible way, it is also better situated to 
do so fairly.16 Legislatures can set reduced or alternative 
sentences uniformly, and so eliminate the unfairness that 
can come with judges sometimes deciding to use cost to 
reduce sentences and sometimes not. Having judges 
determine costs has the wrong institution pursuing what 
is undoubtedly a worthy social goal.
It may be that the reform to the SARs was borne out of 
frustration with the Missouri legislature’s failure to take 
criminal justice reform seriously. And on this level, the 
Sentencing Commission cannot be faulted. There is a lot 
to be frustrated about in Missouri’s system of criminal 
justice. And the recurring threats to abolish the Missouri 
Sentencing Commission are certainly wrongheaded. The 
Commission is right to highlight the problems facing the 
criminal justice system, and the increasing cost of pun-
ishment has a good claim to be problem number one. But 
it is an open question (in part, an open empirical ques-
tion) whether letting judges use cost as a sentencing 
factor is the best way to go about trying to reduce the cost 
of criminal justice, and whether it will cause more harm 
than good.
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